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I.

INTRODUCTION

The current state of taxation of financial instruments is a
mess.1 The rules are complicated, unfair, inconsistent, and
patchwork; there is no underlying policy or vision guiding the
development of the rules.
In general, when a financial instrument comes to the
attention of the Department of the Treasury (the "Treasury"), it
solicits input on the appropriate treatment, before determining
how that instrument will be taxed. 2 Although the world of
financial instruments moves quickly, the steps involved in
writing and enacting new regulations can become a drawn-out
process. 3 Credit default swaps present a case study of much that
is wrong with the extant method of rule-promulgation as it
relates to the taxation of financial instruments. In 2004, the
Treasury asked for taxpayer comments on terms and details of
credit default swaps in order to issue regulations on the
appropriate tax treatment of such financial instruments. 4 In
essence, a credit default swap is "a financial contract in which
the protection buyer pays a periodic amount that is a fixed
1.
See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Linda Z. Swartz, U.S. International Tax
Treatment of Financial Derivatives, 97 TNT 61-49 (Mar. 31, 1997) ("To date, [the]
Treasury has failed to propose a single, workable set of tax rules to govern the use of
derivative products either between domestic parties or domestic and foreign parties."); see
also David F. Bradford, Fixing Realization Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency and
Correctness in the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 50 TAX L. REV. 731, 732-33 (1995);
James R. Hamill & Joel S. Sternberg, Linking Tax and Economic Aspects of Convertible
FinancialInstruments, 23 J. TAX'N OF INVESTMENTS 232, 232-33 (2006); David M. Hasen,
A Realization-Based Approach to the Taxation of FinancialInstruments, 57 TAX L. REV.
397, 398-401 (2004); Yoram Keinan, Book Tax Conformity for FinancialInstruments, 6
FLA. TAX REV. 676, 681 (2004); Michael S. Knoll, Put-Call Parity and the Law, 24
CARDOZO L. REV. 61, 61-63 (2002); David S. Miller, Reconciling Policies and Practices in
the Taxation of FinancialInstruments, 77 TAXES-THE TAX MAGAZINE 236, 237-38 (March
1999); David M. Schizer, Balance in the Taxation of Derivative Securities:An Agenda for
Reform, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1886, 1888-90 (2004); Reed Shuldiner, A GeneralApproach to
the Taxation of FinancialInstruments, 71 TEX. L. REV. 243, 245-46 (1993); Jeff Strnad,
Taxing New FinancialProducts: A Conceptual Framework, 46 STAN. L. REV. 569, 569-70
(1994); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., FinancialContract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107
HARV. L. REV. 460, 461 (1994).
2.
See Jacob Goodwin, Treasury Wants Input on New Foreign Investment Regs,
GSN MAGAZINE, Oct. 11, 2007, available at http://www.gsnmagazine.com/cms/features/
news-analysis/101.html.
3.
See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Letting Tax Lawyers Write Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2007, at Cl ('The I.R.S. staff has been cut by a fifth in the last decade ....
The agency, in a formal notice, said it lacked the resources to issue as much guidance as
taxpayers are seeking.").
4.
See I.R.S. Notice 2004-52, 2004-32 I.R.B. 168 (Aug. 9, 2004). For purposes of
this Article, "financial instrument" and "derivative" may be used interchangeably. A
financial instrument is essentially a contract to make or receive payments based on the
value of some underlying financial data. See Investopedia, Financial Instrument,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financialinstrument.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2007).
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number of basis points applied to a notional principal amount[ 5]
and the protection seller pays the decline in value below par of a
reference security of the same notional amount if'a credit event
occurs. 6 A "credit event" can be any event defined as such, but
usually includes the "bankruptcy or insolvency of a reference
credit or the reference credit's failure to make payments on any
7
of its obligations when due."
There are at least four existing categories in which a credit
default swap could be reasonably placed for tax purposes:
economically, it is analogous in certain respects to a contingent
put option, a notional principal contract, 8 a guarantee, and a
form of insurance. 9 The tax and withholding consequences of
each of these potential treatments is significantly different, and,
until Congress or the Treasury clarifies the appropriate
treatment, investors in credit default swaps must determine
which analogy fits their instruments best. 10
And how significant is the problem? The market for credit
default swaps has exploded over the last decade, from
approximately "$200 billion in outstanding notional value in

5.
"Notional principal amount" is essentially the size of the bet entered into by the
parties.
See Investopedia Notional Principal Balance, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/nlnotionalprincipalamount.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2007).
6.
David Z. Nirenberg and Steven L. Kopp, Credit Derivatives: Tax Treatment of
Total Return Swaps, Default Swaps, and Credit-Linked Notes, 87 J. TAX'N 82, 88 (1997);
see also id. at 88, 90.
7.
Id. at 88. For a simple illustrated explanation of how credit default swaps work,
featuring monkeys and crocodiles, see Christoph Niemann, Fun With Swaps, CONDE NAST
PORTFOLIO 328, Mar. 29, 2007, http://www.portfolio.com/slideshows/2007/03/Fun-With.
Swaps/.
8.
A "notional principal contract" is defined in the Treasury regulations as a
contract that "provides for the payment of amounts by one party to another at specified
intervals calculated by reference to a specified index upon a notional principal amount in
exchange for specified consideration or a promise to pay similar amounts." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.446-3(c)(1) (2007). Even though all notional principal contracts are swaps, not all
financial instruments denominated swaps necessarily meet the tax definition of a notional
principal contract; therein lies the confusion as to the proper treatment of a credit default
swap. See Lee A. Sheppard, Credit Derivatives, Guarantees, and the Ponies, 79 TAX
NOTES 1220, 1221-22 (Jun. 8, 1998). Under a credit default swap, the protection seller
only has to pay the protection buyer when and if default occurs. Id. The final payment
may not occur, if the reference security remains credit-worthy. Id.
9.
See I.R.S. Notice 2004-52, 2004-32 I.R.B. 168 (Aug. 9, 2004) (concluding that
CDS analogies could fit into several categories as analyzed by the IRS).
10.
Lee A. Sheppard, ABA Mulls Over Treatment of Credit Default Swaps, 105 TAX
NOTES 156, 156-57, Oct. 7, 2004. Furthermore, in February 2004, the Treasury released
proposed regulations for contingent swaps, which would require holders of contingent
swaps to accrue for the contingency; holders of credit default swaps, which would
arguably be encompassed within the proposed regulations, objected that contingent
default swaps should not be treated in the same manner as total return swaps, toward
which the regulations were directed. Id.
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1999 to $12.5 trillion in June 2005."11 And yet the Treasury only
asked for comments in 200412 and, as of the writing of this
Article, has issued no guidance.
The lack of guidance is bad enough when only sophisticated
investors, who can afford the necessary tax advice, invest in
financial instruments. But it is no longer merely institutions and
wealthy individual investors who are purchasing financial
instruments. 13 Financial instruments are moving to the retail
market, and are being sold in denominations affordable by
everyday investors.14 As less sophisticated investors, who do not
have the same access to tax advice as wealthy and institutional
investors, enter the derivatives market, the uncertainty on how
to treat existing and new financial instruments for tax purposes
will lead to ever-more acute problems in the implementation and
general trust of the tax system. 15
In spite of the obvious and numerous problems with the
taxation of financial instruments, high-level reform does not
appear to be on the table any time soon. In January 2005,
President George W. Bush organized the President's Advisory
Panel on Federal Tax Reform and commissioned it to recommend
ways to make the tax code "simpler, fairer, and more conducive to
economic growth." 16
The panel recommended a "Simplified

11. Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74
U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 623 n.105 (2007).
12.
See I.R.S. Notice 2004-52, 2004.32 I.R.B. 168 (Aug. 9, 2004).
13.
Compare Schizer, supra note 1, at 1893 ('Various regulatory restrictions ...
prevent investors from using derivatives unless they satisfy minimum wealth tests."),
with sources cited infra note 14.
14.
See, e.g., FSA, Speech by Callum McCarthy, Chairman, FSA Financial Services
Forum, Feb. 9, 2006, http://www.fsa.gov.uklpages[Library/Communication/Speeches/
2006/0210_cm.shtml (concerning the retail market of financial products in the U.K.); see
also Samia Farooqui, Korea Opens Retail Market, ASIA RISK MAGAZINE, Apr. 2003,
http://www.asiarisk.com.hk/public/showPage.html?page=1142
(reporting that South
Korea has opened certain derivatives to retail market); Rhea Wessel, Global Boom in
Retail Structured Products Continues; Future Looks Bright for Germany, FIN. ENG'G
NEWS, Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 1, 6, available at http://www.fenews-digital.comfenews/
20060910/?pg=6 (reporting that, in Germany, "[s]tructured products have opened this
asset class [commodities] to retail investors since direct investing in commodities is still
barred to most of them."). In the United States, the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission (the "CFTC") has permitted HedgeStreet, Inc. to sell derivative products,
which it has dubbed "Hedgelets," to retail consumers. These Hedgelets permit investors
to bet changes in, for example, gasoline costs and mortgage rates in increments of not
more than $10. Ann Saphir, HedgeStreet to Woo Individuals to Derivatives Market,
BLOOMBERG, July 16, 2004, available at http://www.hedgestreet.comlabouthedgestreet/
newsreleases/Bloomberg.071604.pdf.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16.
THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAx REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, &
PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM, xi (2005) available at
http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/final-report.
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Income Tax Plan" ("a streamlined version of our current tax
system that would reduce the size and costs of the tax code") and
a "Growth and Investment Tax Plan" (essentially a consumption
tax rather than an income tax). 17 Neither proposal addressed the
taxation of financial instruments in any significant way; the
Simplified Income Tax Plan advocated eliminating taxing capital
gains from the sale of stock in U.S. corporations and taxing all
other income at regular rates,1 8 while the Growth and
Investment Tax Plan would distinguish between financial and
non-financial
business transactions,
generally
excluding
"financial transactions by non-financial firms from the business
tax base." 19 While the Advisory Panel recommended solutions to
a number of complexities and problems with the current income
tax, its recommendations do not address the problems inherent
in the taxation of financial instruments.
This Article proposes a unified regime for taxing financial
instruments, one that will not require further amendment to the
Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") or to the Treasury
regulations every time a new instrument is introduced,
minimizes inefficiencies that lead to tax planning, and is simple
to understand and implement. Section II of this Article will
describe the current tax treatment of a number of financial
instruments, will evaluate the problems with the current overall
method for taxing financial instruments, and will discuss why it
17.
Id. at 59.
18.
Id. at 126. Although it does not refer to financial instruments, presumably
gains and losses on financial instruments would be taxed at ordinary rates. While the
rate of taxation should not matter to investors, see infra notes 157-61 and accompanying
text, the timing option would still permit holders of financial instruments to choose when
to recognize gain and loss. See infra note 141.
19.
PROPOSALS, supra note 16, at 245. As a rule, the tax base of a consumption tax
does not include income from financial transactions. See David A. Weisbach, The (Non)
Taxation of Risk, 58 TAx L. REV. 1, 24 (2004). However, the Advisory Panel recognized
that incentive would exist for taxpayers to recharacterize non-financial transactions as
financial transactions:
Another area where there may be an incentive to recharacterize nonfinancial transactions is the treatment of derivatives. Purchases and sales of
commodities generally are cash flows subject to the cash flow tax. Derivatives
on commodities, in contrast, are generally thought of as financial in nature, the
gains and losses on which generally should not be treated as cash flows subject
to the business cash flow tax. However, there may be circumstances in which
purchases and sales of these derivatives should be subject to the cash flow tax.
For example, a derivative entered into to hedge a non-financial business asset or
liability should be treated similarly to the underlying asset as a non-financial
business transaction subject to the cash flow tax. Absent special rules,
businesses would be able to use combinations of derivatives to create deductions
without offsetting income.
PROPOSALS, supra note 16, at 245. In spite of recognizing the problem, the Advisory
Panel made no recommendations as to possible solutions.
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is not possible or necessary for the Code to delineate bright-line
borders between different financial instruments. Section III will
discuss policy criteria that need to be considered in evaluating or
designing a proposed tax system, and how the current taxation of
financial instruments measures up to the policy criteria. Section
IV proposes that investors be permitted to elect, ex ante, which of
two tax treatments will apply to their portfolio of financial
instruments. It first discusses two other elective regimes, and
then makes specific proposals for how an elective regime taxing
financial instruments would work. It finally measures such a
regime against the policy criteria that need to be considered.
Section IV discusses some practical issues that could arise in
reforming the taxation of financial instruments, and why the
proposed reforms should be palatable to members of Congress on
both sides of the aisle.
1I.

CURRENT TAXATION OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS

Rather than resulting from a unified tax policy, the current
system of taxing financial instruments has been assembled in a
haphazard manner, generally reacting to financial innovation
20
either by creating a new taxing regime for the new instrument,
or by analogizing it to an existing instrument, as the Treasury
appears to be doing with respect to credit default swaps. Both
approaches, however, have significant problems.
A.

Current DerivativeRegimes

In taxing financial instruments, there are two major
variables that must be considered: timing and character. 2 1 There
are three main timing options with which to tax income: it can be
taxed upfront, on a "wait and see" (or realization) basis, or on a
mark-to-market basis. 22 Under the current federal income tax,
income can have one of two characters: it is either ordinary
income or capital gain. 23 The current taxation of financial
instruments incorporates all three timings and both characters,
depending on the instrument. This Section will summarize the
24
current tax treatment of some financial instruments.
20.
Miller, supra note 1.
21.
See Shuldiner, supra note 1, at 247-49 (1992) (discussing timing generally);
I.R.C. § 64 (2000) (discussing character generally); I.R.C. § 1222.
22.
See Shuldiner, supra note 1, at 247-49.
23.
I.R.C. § 64.
24.
This Section will not attempt to be exhaustive; for a more exhaustive treatment
of the current regimes for the taxation of derivatives, see generally KEVIN M. KEYES,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND TRANSACTIONS (2003).
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Regular Options and Forwards

When an investor purchases an option, she pays an option
premium for the right to purchase (in the case of a call option) or
sell (in the case of a put option) property on or before a specified
date at a specified price. 25 The tax law uses a wait-and-see
approach to the taxation of options; until the option is exercised,
expires, or is sold, neither the seller nor the buyer recognizes any
gain or loss, including on the option premium. 26 When a
realization event occurs, the seller recognizes the option
premium, as well as any gain or loss on the property sold. 27 The
gain or loss will be capital if the underlying asset was held as a
28
capital asset.
Forward contracts are contracts for the purchase or sale of
property on a specified date in the future. 29 Forward contracts
can be physically settled, through the delivery of the property, or
cash-settled, by paying the difference between the purchase price
and the current market price. 30
As with options, forward
contracts are taxed when a realization event, such as the sale,
exchange, or settlement of the contract occurs, and the character
of gain and loss depends on the character of the underlying
asset.31

25.
In an American option, the optionee can exercise her option at any point up to
and including the exercise date; in a European option, the optionee can only exercise on
the exercise date. See generally SHELDON NATENBERG, OPTION VOLATILITY & PRICING 4 &
6 (1994). However, economically, it generally does not make sense to exercise an option
early, so, for all practical purposes, there is no substantive difference between American
and European options. Cf. id. ch. 12 (discussing early exercise of American options).
26.
See Va. Iron Coal & Coke Co. v. Comm'r, 37 B.T.A. 195, 198 (1938) ("Thus it is
necessary to exclude such [option] payments from the income of the year in which
received and to include them for the later year when, for the first time, a satisfactory
determination of their character for income tax purposes can be made.), aff'd, 99 F.2d 919
(4th Cir. 1938); Rev. Rul. 58-234, 1958-1 C.B. 279, 283 ("It is manifest, from the nature
and consequences of 'put' or 'call' option premiums and obligations, that there is no
Federal income tax incidence on account of either the receipt or the payment of such
option premiums ...unless and until the options have been terminated . .
27.
I.R.C. § 1234(b); Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265.
28.
I.R.C. § 1234(a)(1).
29.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 345 (8th ed. 2004).
30.
See Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-The-Counter Derivatives,
2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 677, 698.
31.
See, e.g., Warren, supra note 1, at 464 (stating that "there are no tax
consequences until gain or loss is realized on performance or disposition of the [forward]
contract.").
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2.

Section 1256

Certain types of options and futures contracts are taxed
under § 1256 of the Code. 32 If a financial instrument is a "§ 1256
contract," it is marked-to-market annually, and the investor pays
tax on any appreciation or deducts any depreciation that has
occurred over the course of the prior year. 33 The character of any
gain or loss on a § 1256 contract is idiosyncratic: a taxpayer must
treat sixty percent of the gain or loss as long-term and forty
34
percent as short-term capital gain or loss.
3.

Swaps 35

Very generally, swaps call for periodic and non-periodic
payments between counterparties, based on the movement of an
objective financial reference. 36 Although the regulations are not
clear on the character of swap payments, periodic payments are
generally treated as ordinary income or loss in the year in which
they are made. 37 Termination payments are generally treated as
38
capital gain or loss.
4.

Anti-Abuse Provisions

Because of the gaps in the treatment of financial
instruments and the economic flexibility that inheres in them,
Congress has also had to pass several anti-abuse provisions.
Among these anti-abuse provisions are the constructive sale and
straddle provisions. 39 Under the constructive sale regime, an
investor who sufficiently hedges an "appreciated financial
position," to the degree that she has (virtually) no upside or
downside risk remaining in the investment, 40 will be treated as if
32.
I.R.C. § 1256(a)-(b).
33.
Id. § 1256(a)(1).
34.
Id. § 1256(a)(3).
35.
Actually, it is more accurate to say "notional principal contract." As discussed
supra, it is not clear that every instrument denominated a "swap," even if it is written on
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association ("ISDA") contract, qualifies as a
notional principal contract for tax purposes. See supra text accompanying notes 4-6, 8; see
also Treas. Reg. § 1.1234A-1(c) (proposed Feb. 26, 2004).
36.
Miller, supra note 1, at 242.
37.
Id.
38.
Id; see also I.R.C. § 1234; Treas. Reg. § 1.1234-1.
39.
See KEYES, supra note 24, at 14.05.
40.
I.R.C. § 1259(b)(1). The simplest example is an investor who purchased XYZ
stock at $20 several years ago. Today, XYZ is worth $100. Our investor thinks that it has
essentially peaked, but for whatever reason does not want to sell it. In order to cash out,
then, she enters into the short side of a swap on XYZ stock, which requires her to pay to
the counterparty any appreciation on the stock while receiving payment for any
depreciation of the stock. On entering into the swap, she has no economic interest left in
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she had sold it. She will be treated as if she made a sale even if
she still technically owns the investment, and she will be
required to recognize any gain (but not loss) on the constructive
41
sale.
Where an investor holds "offsetting positions with respect to
personal property" and those positions substantially diminish the
investor's risk of loss, the investor is subject to the straddle
rules. 42 Under the straddle rules, an investor can realize loss on
one leg of a straddle only to the extent that it exceeds gain on the
other leg. 43 However, in spite of the relative simplicity of the
examples of constructive sales and straddles offered in this
Article, the rules are complex and difficult to parse; for example,
there is no clear answer as to how much exposure to gain and
loss removes an investor from these anti-abuse rules. 44 Although
they are necessary to prevent aggressive and abusive behavior
under the current tax regime, these rules only add to the
complexity and inefficiency of the current taxation of financial
instruments.
B.

Problems with the Current Regime

The necessity of creating a new taxing regime for each
financial instrument suffers from two major problems: it
increases the complexity of the Code, and because there is a lag
between the introduction of an instrument and its tax
classification, it creates inefficiencies. These inefficiencies are a
drain on the market and diminish taxpayers' confidence in the
45
tax system.

her XYZ stock; prior to the enactment of the constructive sale rules, she would be taxed as
the periodic payments were made, but would not be taxed on the $80 of appreciation she
had locked in until she actually sold her XYZ stock. KEYES, supra note 24, at 1 14.05[6].
41.
See I.R.C. § 1259.
42.
See KEYES, supra note 24, at 17.02.
43.
I.R.C. § 1092(a); KEYES, supra note 24, at
17.02[2][a]. Suppose that an
investor owns a share of XYZ stock worth $100, this time with a basis of $100. On July 1,
2007, she enters into a forward contract to sell XYZ stock at $100 in one year. Her
ownership of the stock and her short position in the forward contract are offsetting
positions: if the value of her XYZ stock diminishes by $20, the value of her position in the
forward contract increases by $20. On December 1, 2007, XYZ stock has fallen to $80.
Under the straddle rules, if she were to sell the stock but stay in the forward contract, she
would not be permitted to recognize the $20 loss in 2007, unless she also sold her position
in the forward contract. Otherwise, if she stayed in the forward contract until maturity,
she would be able to deduct her $20 loss against any gain in 2008. See, e.g., KEYES, supra
note 24, at 17.02[2] [a].
44.
David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1312, 1345-46 n.110 (2001).
45.
Knoll, supra note 1, at 90-91 & n.104.
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1.

Complexity

The potential number of financial instruments that can be
created is limitless. As has been discussed, there already exist a
number of regimes in the Code purporting to regulate the tax
treatment of various transactions, 46 as well as a number of antiabuse regimes on top of the regular treatment. 47 Economically
similar financial instruments can have wildly varying tax
treatments because
each category
has been created
independently, in response to a perceived need by Congress, 48 the
Treasury, 4 9 or tax practitioners. 50
If the tax treatment of
financial innovation continues to be regulated in such a
haphazard "cubbyhole" 51 approach, the Code's complexity will
52
only continue to balloon.
In the period between the introduction of a new instrument
and a consensus (whether official or informal) about its
appropriate
tax treatment, inconsistent treatment
can
"encourage waste and create a perception of unfairness. '5 3 The
time that lawyers and accountants spend figuring out how a
taxpayer should report income from an instrument and the time
spent figuring out how to arbitrage inconsistencies in the
treatment of economically similar instruments is waste. 54 This
economic waste, measured in money and time spent avoiding
taxes, 55 could be better spent in socially and economically
46.
See discussion supra Part II.A. Miller enumerates "more than a dozen . . .
cubbyholes" for financial instruments. Miller, supra note 1, at 237. However, a number
of the instruments he refers to are debt instruments or other investments that do not
meet the definition of "financial instrument" being used in this Article.
See id.
Nonetheless, there are enough cubbyholes, as well as anti-abuse regimes, to keep the
taxation of financial instruments complicated, even defining "financial instrument" in
such a way that it only includes risk-based returns.
47.
See KEYES, supranote 24, at 14.05.
48.
See Schizer, supranote 44, at 1343-44.
49.
I.R.S. Notice 2004-52, 2004-32 I.R.B. 168 (Aug. 9 2004).
50.
See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Prevost, Chair of the ISDA North American Tax
Committee, to Barbara Angus, International Tax Counsel, Treasury (Nov. 21, 2003) in
2003 TNT 232-17; Letter from Thomas Prevost, Chair of ISDA North American Tax
Committee, to Internal Revenue Service (May 2, 2003) in 2003 TNT 118-26; Letter from
Gregory May and Robert Scarborough, Freshfields Buckhaus Derringer LLP, to Helen
Hubbard, Acting Tax Legislative Counsel, and Barbara Angus, International Tax
Counsel, Treasury (Oct. 1, 2002) in 2002 TNT 226-21.
51.
See Miller, supra note 1, at 237-38.
52.
See Warren, supra note 1, at 460 (describing the financial innovation of the last
20 years through disaggregation, recombination, etc.).
53.
Knoll, supra note 1, at 90.
54.
Id. For purposes of this Article, "waste" is defined as "[tiransactions which do
not create wealth." Donald Rutherford, ROUTLEDGE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 599
(1992).
55.
See Knoll, supra note 1, at 91.
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productive ways. Also, because only the wealthy can afford to
discover and exploit the inconsistencies (and, indeed, only the
wealthy could potentially gain enough in tax savings to offset the
cost), only the wealthy reap the advantages of these tax
inconsistencies. Thus, similarly-situated taxpayers, with similar
economic investments, will be treated differently, adding to a
general perception that the tax system is unfair and favors the
56
wealthy.
2.

Economic Substance

Taxation by analogy is likewise an ineffective way to
determine the appropriate tax treatment of new financial
instruments.
Financial instruments allow a taxpayer to
57
synthetically create the income flow that the taxpayer desires.
This correspondence is referred to as "put-call parity" which,
although essential to the argument that follows, has been
extensively described in other places. 58 Essentially, put-call
parity states that an investor can synthesize the ownership of a
share of stock by buying a zero-coupon bond, selling a put, and
buying a call at the current stock price. 59 The option premium
paid by the investor for the call should be the same as the
premium received from selling the put. 60 If the stock were to
increase in value above the strike price, the put would expire
unexercised, and the investor's profit on the call would equal the
increase in value of the stock. 6 1 If the stock price were to go
down, the call would expire unexercised and the investor's loss on
the put would be the same as her loss on the share of stock would
have been. 62 The only differences between such a synthetic share
of stock and an actual share of stock are that the actual
shareholder has the right to receive dividends and to vote. 63 An
investor could contract for the right to direct a shareholder's vote,
however, and can also contract to receive dividends, thereby
synthetically creating an instrument with all of the rights
64
inherent in a share of stock.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See id.
See id. at 62.
Id. at 63; see also Warren, supra note 1, at 465-67.
See Knoll, supra note 1, at 72.
See Warren, supra note 1, at 464.
See Knoll, supra note 1, at 65.
See id.

63.

WILLIAM L. CLARK, JR. & I. MAURICE WORMSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 418 (3d ed. 1916).
64.
This is assuming a tax-free world; the qualified dividend income rate would not
apply to the artificial dividends, creating a friction. I.R.C. § 1(h)(11). Financial
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Because financial instruments can synthetically recreate
any cash flow an investor desires, there is no perfect economic
analogy for a given instrument. Rather, tax advisors tweak the
instruments, leaving a twenty percent band of risk, for
example, 65 so that investors achieve the most advantageous tax
treatment possible without significantly sacrificing their
economic goals.
For the previously-mentioned reasons, in the world of
financial products, it is a near-impossible task to create bright
lines delineating where one instrument ends and the next begins.
There is simply insufficient economic difference between the
potential instruments, and there are infinite possible variations
on each theme. Even demarcating the difference between debt
and equity has proven virtually impossible, 6 6 although the tax
law clearly delineates the distinct tax results of an investment in
debt and an investment in equity. 67 Although "interest" has been
judicially defined as "compensation for the use or forbearance of
money," 68 it has not proven so easy to define "instruments that
pay interest." Rather, the courts use a balancing test that
involves up to sixteen criteria, with no indication of the weight
69
accorded to any one criterion.
C.

The CurrentRegime's Bright Lines Are Unnecessary

Provided that the tax system can differentiate risk-based
returns from wage income and returns based on the time value of
money, it is unnecessary to draw distinct lines between different
financial instruments. 70 Financial instruments are zero-sum
instruments are not just good for creating artificial stocks and bonds, however-an
investor can use a swap or credit-linked bond to replicate the return of an index, of a
hedge or mutual fund, a commodity, or just about any other return an investor wants.
65.
See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 44, at 1345 ('The typical way to avoid [§]1259,
understood by the government and taxpayer alike, is to retain some exposure to the
hedged asset's return.").
66.
See Weisbach, supra note 19, at 1627. The Supreme Court has, numerous
times, declined to offer a rigorous definition of "interest." See William T. Plumb, Jr., The
Federal Income Tax Significanceof Corporate Debt: A CriticalAnalysis and a Proposal,26
TAX L. REV. 369, 370 (1971). Congress has similarly refused to act; instead it "passed the
ball to the Treasury" in enacting § 385 of the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") in 1969.
Id. at 370 nn.9-10. The Treasury issued proposed regulations, but later withdrew the
proposed regulations, and, as of the writing of this Article, has not advanced any further
attempt to define "interest." See T.D. 7747, 1981-1 C.B. 141; T.D. 7920, 1983-2 C.B. 69.
67.
Plumb, supra note 66, at 369.
68.
Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 498 (1940).
69.
See Plumb, supra note 66, at 407, et seq.
70.
See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 1,at 1900 ("Although this reform strategy can be
effective for risky bets, it is not effective for time-value returns or wages. Because these
sources of income are expected to be positive (so market uncertainty is not a factor), and
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investments, essentially bets on the movement of an underlying
financial referent. 7 1 If an investor correctly predicts the direction
of the underlying referent, the investor "wins" the bet; if she is
wrong, she loses. However, ex ante, she cannot know whether
she will win or lose. 72 If she wins her bet, she will receive $X. If
she loses, she will pay her counterparty $X. As Professor Schizer
has demonstrated, ex ante, the taxpayer is indifferent to how she
is taxed, provided that her gain is taxed at the same rate and in
the "same manner as her loss." 73 If she expects to either receive
or pay $100, at a 15% rate, she will either owe $15 of tax or have
74
a $100 loss which will shelter $15 of gain from taxation.

because they cannot be scaled up costlessly, inconsistencies still inspire planning, even if
the gain-loss ratio is set at one.").
See, e.g., id. at 1896.
71.
It would make sense that investors generally expect to win; such expectation
72.
need not be held universally, however-a deductible loss can shelter other gains from tax.
But even if every investor expects to win every bet, half of the investors in two-party
financial instruments have to lose. This is the reason that time-value and wage returns
must be excluded in order to fairly tax financial instruments: an investor is not betting on
receiving such returns; rather, they are essentially assured. See id. at 1890.
Of course, for her to be truly indifferent, it is necessary that losses be fully
73.
deductible. Id. at 1908-12. ("The first prong of the reform agenda is to set the gain-loss
ratio at one for all derivatives so that taxpayers will have little incentive to game
inconsistencies."). Currently, for a corporation or an individual who is considered a trader
or a dealer, losses are fully deductible, provided the taxpayer has sufficient income to be
offset. Id. at 1911. However, investment losses are deemed "miscellaneous itemized
deductions" for individuals who are not traders or dealers, I.R.C. § 67(b), and are subject
both to the 2% floor (i.e., deductions are permissible only to the extent that they exceed
2% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income), I.R.C. § 67(a), and to a phase-out at certain
income levels. I.R.C. § 68(a). Essentially, the gain-loss ratio for an individual investor is
1:0.98, meaning that, before she knows how the bet will turn out, an investor can expect
to pay $100 in taxes if she wins, but can only expect to be able to deduct $98 if she loses.
See Schizer, supra note 1, at 1898-99. This, combined with the fact that an investment in
a financial instrument, while requiring credit-worthiness, does not generally require a
significant initial outlay of cash, both make it impossible to costlessly scale up the bet, id.,
and produces inconsistencies that can be exploited. Id. at 1898-99, 1908.
This sounds like partnership theory of tax, in which taxes are justified because
74.
the government gets its share for supplying a system that allows taxpayers to make
money. For a general description of this partnership theory of income taxation, see
generally, Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit,
Partnership,and Ability-to-Pay Principles,58 TAX L. REV. 399, 444-48 (2005). But, in the
case of financial instruments, the purpose of taxing is not income, but rather discouraging
slippage from other types of income. Schizer, supra note 1, at 1924-25. In a practical
sense, it becomes a partnership, but, whether or not one accepts the partnership theory
underlying the government's right to tax, for risk-based income, it functions economically
as a partnership: the government gets a portion of the investor's gain, and absorbs that
same portion of the investor's loss. Thus, this Article does not intend to justify or contest
taxation on any moral or policy theory; rather, this Section is intended to be descriptive of
the economics underlying the taxation of financial instruments.
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At a 35% rate, she will owe $35 or shelter $35 of gain from
taxation. 7 5 Professor Schizer then argues that consistency in the
treatment of financial instruments is both unattainable and
unnecessary, and that the rate does not matter, provided that an
investor's gain and loss will be treated the same. 76 He calls his
policy goal "balance." 77 If an instrument's tax treatment is
balanced, and an investor knows in advance what that treatment
will be, she should be able to costlessly scale up her investment
in order to achieve her desired after-tax result; specifically, if she
knows the tax rate will be 15% and she wants a $100 after-tax
return (and is willing to accept a $100 after-tax loss), then she
should invest in an instrument with an expected return of
$117.65.
If she accurately predicts the direction of the
underlying, she will have $100 after tax. 78 If she loses, she will
pay $117.65, but will be able to offset $117.65 of income,
resulting in a tax savings of $17.65, giving her an after-tax loss of
$100. If, however, the tax rate is 50% and she wants the same
result, she will invest such an amount that the expected pre-tax
return is $200. If she wins, after taxes she will have $100, and if
she loses, she will be able to offset $200 of gains, resulting in a
tax savings of $100. 79 Provided gains and losses are treated in
the same manner, an investor is indifferent to the tax treatment
of risk-based return.8 0 Bright-line delineation between different
instruments is unnecessary as long as all of an investor's
financial instrument income is taxed in the same manner as her
financial instrument deductible loss.

75.
As Professor Schizer explains, the investor essentially partners with the
government. At the 15% rate, the investor takes home 85% of the gain, and the
government takes its 15% share. If the investment is a loser, however, the investor only
loses $85, and the government absorbs the other $15 of loss. Schizer, supra note 1, at
1893-95.
76.
Id. at 1895-96.
77.
Id. at 1896.
78.
117.65 x 0.85 = 100. In order to earn an after-tax return of Y, an investor must
invest 1/(1-r) x Y, where r = rate of tax.
79.
See Schizer, supranote 1, at 1898-99; see also Weisbach, supra note 20, at 8-11.
80.
Note that this result no longer holds once the investor knows what the end
result will be; at that point, if she will have a loss, she would rather lock in an ordinary
loss (currently at a 35% rate) immediately. If she will have gain, she would prefer it to be
long-term capital gain, at a current 15% rate, and would prefer to defer its taxation. One
significant problem with uncertainty in the tax treatment of financial instruments is that
such uncertainty makes it possible for investors to attempt to classify their investments
ex post, once they know if they won or lost. As Congress reacts to such re-characterization
occurrence by occurrence, the tax code becomes needlessly more complicated, while not
gaining any coherent overall direction. See, e.g., supra Part II.A. (discussing current tax
treatment of various financial instruments). But as long as it continues to take three, six,
or nine years to create rules for financial instruments, even where significant use of the
instrument already exists, such cracks will continue both to exist and to be exploited.
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POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Although there are many and varied criteria that can be
used to evaluate a tax regime, in general, three essential
criteria-equity, efficiency, and some combination of simplicity,
transparency, and administrability-are generally considered the
most important. 8 ' However, these criteria often conflict with
each other, and people differ on how to weigh each criterion.
Nonetheless, these criteria offer a valuable standard against
which to measure a new tax regime.
A.

Equity

In analyzing whether a tax is equitable, it is worth assessing
the taxpayer's ability to pay.8 2 Ability-to-pay considerations
undergird a realization-based system of taxation, such as the
federal income tax.8 3 In general, income is not taxed when it
economically accrues; rather, the tax system waits until money
has changed hands.8 4 Subsets of ability-to-pay are horizontal
and vertical equity.8 5 Horizontal equity requires that similarlysituated taxpayers be taxed in a similar manner.8 6 In the world
81.
See PROPOSALS, supra note 16, at 5-35, 64.
82.
Id. at 30.
83.
Id.
84.
For example, say I bought a second apartment as an investment 10 years ago on
the Upper West Side of Manhattan for $300,000. (For the sake of this example, assume
that the apartment is not, and has never been, my primary residence.) In the ensuing 10
years, the neighborhood has become gentrified, and apartments like mine are now in
demand. Apartments like mine are selling today for $800,000. I know this because a
broker showed up at my door this morning, check in hand, and told me that his client
would like to buy my apartment for $800,000. Economically, I am $500,000 better off
today than I was 10 years ago. I will not be taxed on that $500,000, however, until I
actually sell the apartment. One reason is that, while my apartment may be worth
$500,000 more than it was when I bought it, that $500,000 is illiquid; I may well not have
$75,000 (a long-term capital gain rate of 15% on a $500,000 gain) floating around with
which to pay my taxes. Note, however, that certain regimes permit the taxation of
unrealized gains; many are punitive (e.g., the passive foreign investment company rules of
I.R.C. §§ 1291-1298 (2000)), some are intended to prevent an investor from deferring taxes
by restructuring an investment (e.g., the original issue discount rules of § 1273), and some
assume that a taxpayer does have access to liquid funds (e.g., the § 475 mark-to-market
rules for dealers in securities).
85.
PROPOSALS, supranote 16, at 9.
86.
"Taxing similar activities differently causes behavioral distortions and
unfairness." David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law 9
(Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics (2d Series), Working Paper No. 62,
1998),
available
at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon[WkngPprs_51-75/
62.Weisbach.Line.complete.pdf.
Targeted tax expenditures, such as deductions and credits, could affect
horizontal equity throughout the tax system because they may favor certain
types of economic behavior over other by taxpayers with similar financial
conditions. For example, two taxpayers with the same income and identical
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of taxing financial instruments, the goal of horizontal equity is
generally termed "consistency, meaning that the same tax
87
treatment should apply to economically comparable bets."
Vertical equity is concerned with the difference in ability to pay
88
by taxpayers in different financial circumstances.
B.

Efficiency

An economically efficient tax creates minimal economic
distortions.8 9 This means, essentially, that the imposition of a
given tax will not cause taxpayers to alter their behavior. 90 In
the case of financial instruments, an economically efficient tax is
one that will not, for example, cause a taxpayer to purchase
structured notes when, in a tax-free world, she would rather own
swaps. 9 1 As with the other criteria, a good tax regime does not
houses may be taxed differently if one owns his or her house and the other rents
because mortgage interest on owner-occupied housing is tax deductible.
Yair Holtzman, Challenges in Achieving Transparency, Simplicity, and Administering of
the United States Tax Code, 26 J. MGMT. DEV. 418, 424 (2007).
87.
Schizer, supra note 1, at 1889. Please note that Professor Schizer, in his article,
is not advocating consistency as such, but rather explaining the difficulties with
consistency, explaining that "familiar political and administrative barriers stand in the
way, rendering consistency unattainable for now." Id. at 1890.
This is essentially the distinction between progressive versus regressive tax
88.
rates. See Holtzman, supra note 87, at 424. See also PROPOSALS, supra note 16, at 30-34
(describing current progressive rate scheme; providing statistics of proportional total tax
revenues as derived from taxpayers of various income levels).
89.
Id. at 36.
Id.
90.
91.
Credit-linked notes and swaps were chosen deliberately. On December 16,
2005, the Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") released Rev. Rul. 2006-1, 2006-2 I.R.B.
261, which announced that commodity swaps (essentially, swaps that replicate the return
of a commodity index) did not produce qualifying income for mutual funds. A number of
"commodity" mutual funds had come into existence over the previous several years, and
were generally investing in commodity swaps (because direct investments in commodities
also did not produce qualifying income. I.R.C. § 851(b)(2)). See, e.g., Rydex Series Funds,
Definitive Materials (Form 497) (Dec. 27, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/899148/000093506905003461/g20940_seriesfunds497e.txt (explaining, in an SEC
filing soon after the release of Rev. Rul. 2006-1, that "the Fund currently gains most of its
exposure to the commodities markets by entering into swap agreements on a commodities
index"). The revenue ruling gave mutual funds six months to change their investments;
any commodity mutual fund that continued after that point to invest in commodity swaps
would lose its regulated investment company status, essentially causing it to lose its taxSo the commodity mutual funds turned to commodity-linked
advantaged status.
structured notes (which likewise replicate the returns of a commodity index, essentially
producing the same economics as a commodity swap); Rydex Series Funds, Definitive
Materials (Form 497) (Apr. 12, 2006), http:llwww.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/datal
899148/000093506906001076/g32657sticker.txt ('The Fund has received a private letter
ruling . . .that concludes that certain commodities-linked notes held by the Fund will
produce qualifying income for purposes of the RIC qualification tests. The Advisor
believes it can continue to successfully operate the Fund . . . by investing in these
commodities-linked structured notes."). Although the economics of swaps and credit-
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need to entirely eliminate distortions caused by the tax, but the
distortions must be kept in mind and weighed against the other
criteria.
C.

Simplicity, Transparency,and Administrability

Simplicity,
transparency,
and
administrability
are
interrelated and desirable features of a tax system. 92 A simple
tax regime makes it easier for taxpayers to comply. 93 The
compliance burden of a tax includes time and money spent
keeping records, understanding taxes, planning, 94 preparing and
filing tax returns, and engaging in audits. 95 "A transparent tax
system is one that taxpayers are able to understand." 96 Because

a transparent system leads to less uncertainty, taxpayers can
97
better plan their employment, consumption, and investment.
Finally, an administrable tax system is one that allows taxes to
be collected in the most cost-effective manner possible. 98 Nina
Olson, the National Taxpayer Advocate, testified before the
Senate Finance Sub-Committee on Taxation and Internal
Revenue Service Oversight, saying, "[flor taxpayers who
generally will go to great lengths to comply [with the tax law],
the likely source of noncompliance is the complexity of the tax
code. .

.

. For taxpayers who will comply if doing so is easy

enough, our main emphasis should be on simpler laws and
procedures." 99

linked structured notes are similar, and although both allow investors exposure to the
same commodities risk, Rev. Rul. 2006-1 created a distortion, causing certain investors to
invest in one financial instrument where, absent the revenue ruling, they would prefer to
invest in another.
92.
See PROPOSALS, supra note 16, at xi-xiii; see generally Holtzman, supra note 86.
93.
See Holtzman, supra note 86, at 425.
94.
"Tax planning" is often the result of tax system inefficiencies. Investors require
resources to understand the implications of structuring an investment in different ways.
They also require resources to structure their investments to produce the desired tax
structure. See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1339, 1352-53
(2000).
95.
See Holtzman, supra note 86, at 425.
96.
Id. at 418.
97.
Id.
98.
Id. at 419.
99.
Nina Olsen, National Taxpayer Advocate, Written Statement Before the Senate
Finance Sub-Comittee on Taxation and IRS Oversight, at 3 (July 26, 2006), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/ntatestimonysfctax-gap072606.pdf.
She continued with
respect to taxpayers who are actively trying to avoid payment of taxes: "I think IRS
employees generally should focus on trying to induce the taxpayers to comply
prospectively." Id.
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D.

Policy Failuresof the Current Regime

The current methods of taxing financial instruments fail
under all of these criteria. The taxation of financial instruments
is not horizontally equitable-two similarly situated investors
may both take a long position in the same corporation's stock, but
the tax results of their investments may differ. Similarly, they
are not vertically equitable, because often only the wealthy can
engage in tax planning using financial instruments due to
financial and regulatory concerns.10 0
As a result of the
haphazard approach to the development of systems with which to
tax financial instruments, the various regimes are economically
inefficient; they allow a sophisticated investor to change the way
she is taxed without making significant changes to the actual
economics of her investment. 10 1 Again, because of the haphazard
way the tax system has developed, it is not simple, transparent,
02
or easily administrable.
IV.

ELECTIVE TAXATION

What this Article proposes, then, is an elective regime for
the taxation of risk-based returns on financial instruments. An
elective regime may not satisfy all tax policy concerns with
respect to financial instruments. 103 However, the advantages of
the certainty that such an elective regime would provide, as well
as the inefficiencies and unfairness of the current system,
outweigh objections that may arise under the complicated and
theoretical doctrinal concerns that traditionally guide tax
policy. 104 Particularly, where a line must be drawn, the doctrines
that traditionally guide tax policy are unhelpful. 105 Line drawing
requires a tax-writer to determine what the essential qualities of
100.
Hasen, supra note 1, at 399; Schizer, supra note 1, at 1893.
101.
Hasen, supra note 1, at 399 ("Inconsistency arises when the tax treatment of a
single economic return depends solely on the form in which it is received. Here the
problem results from the dramatically enhanced capability that financial contract
innovation affords taxpayers to replicate economic returns subject to tax on an accrual
basis with instruments taxed (in whole or in part) on a realization basis, and vice-versa.").
102.
See Holtzman, supranote 86, at 418.
103.
It is relevant to note that, even if an elective regime does not meet all of the
policy considerations discussed infra in Part III, neither does the current regime. This
Article is intended to demonstrate that an elective regime for the taxation of financial
instruments better meets the criteria for a good tax than the current system, and than
other systems that have been proposed.
104.
David A. Weisbach has argued that 'line drawing in the tax law can and should
be based on the efficiency of competing rules" rather than on "[dioctrinal concerns ... or
traditional tax policy . . . [which] are neither helpful nor relevant to most disputes."
Weisbach, supranote 86, at 2.
105.
See id. at 1643.
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a financial instrument are, and requires the taxpayer to figure
06
out which essence her financial instrument most resembles.
The problem with drawing lines for the taxation of financial
instruments, however, is that there is essentially no
metaphysical
difference
between
them-put-call
parity
demonstrates that the economics of any financial instrument can
07
be replicated through some combination of other instruments.
When a taxpayer can elect ex ante how her investment in
derivatives will be taxed, and such election is locked in before she
enters into the derivative contract, the only question is whether
she will have gain or loss. As long as she can no longer choose
the tax treatment of her investment after she knows what the
result will be, 0 8 she will not have an incentive to engage in
planning.
The tax code already contains multiple elective
regimes: a description of two of these regimes, the mark-tomarket election of § 475(f) of the Internal Revenue Code for
investors and the check-the-box regulations of Treasury
Regulation § 1.7701-3, will be illustrative for purposes of this
Article.
A.

CurrentElective Regimes
1.

Mark-to-Market for Traders

Under Code § 475, a dealer in securities or commodities is
required to mark its positions in securities or commodities to the
market. 0 9 Under a mark-to-market system, a taxpayer annually
takes into account the change in value in her property without
regard to whether or not she has monetized that investment.1 10
106.
Id. ('The typical approach to line drawing is platonic. It searches for the
essential meaning of words, such as corporation, partnership, debt, equity, selling, or
holding, and draws lines accordingly.").
107.
See supraPart II.B.2.
108.
Take, for example, an investor who has entered into a forward contract that
settles January 6, 2007, and on December 28, 2006, it is clear that she bet wrong. Under
the current system, she can sell or settle her investment early to lock in a loss in the
current year. If, however, she were in a gain position on December 28, she would wait
until the settlement date and defer her gain for a year, thus effectively electing her tax
treatment, or at least the timing of that treatment ex post facto.
109.
I.R.C. § 475(f) (2000).
110.
Although mark-to-market violates (in some instances) ability-to-pay concerns, it
essentially contravenes the current realization-based system of taxation. See supra Part
II.A.l. Mark-to-market is probably the most accurate and best way to account for
financial instruments, under the Haig-Simons definition of income. David S. Miller, A
Progressive System of Mark-to.Market Taxation, 109 TAX NOTES 1047, 1053 (2005).
Under Code § 475, at the end of each year a dealer in securities would determine the
value of each of its securities and compare that value to the value of the same security a
year earlier (or, if the dealer has not held the security for a year, the value at the time of
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In 1997, Congress enacted Code § 475(f),111 which permits
traders (but not investors) 112 to mark-to-market their
investments in securities. 113 In order to elect mark-to-market
treatment, a trader that is an entity must file a statement on its
books and with the IRS either the year before the election is to
become effective or within three months of the formation of the
entity, whichever is later. 114 An individual must file the election
with her tax return in the year before it is to become effective. 115
Once the election has been made, it is effective for all securities
held by the trader, unless the trader designates an investment as
not being marked-to-market on the day she makes the
investment. 116 Although it is not completely clear who may make
the election (i.e., whether any given security holder is an investor
or a trader), and although the manner of making the election is
not crystal clear (i.e., the regulations do not spell out what
exactly must be said in the statement that is to be attached to
the trader's tax return), by allowing traders to elect to be taxed
on a mark-to-market basis, traders gain some amount of
certainty and simplicity. 117
2.

Check-the-Box Entity Classification

Under the check-the-box regulations, most business entities
can choose how they will be treated for tax purposes. 118 By
purchase). I.R.C. § 475(f)(1)(A)(i). The dealer aggregates the gains and losses and takes
the net result as an ordinary gain or loss. I.R.C. § 475(d)(3)(A)(i).
111.
Act of Aug. 5, 1997, Pub. L. 105-34, 111 Stat. 978 (election of mark-to-market for
marketable stock) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 475(f)).
112.
The exclusion of investors from I.R.C. § 475(f) mark-to-market accounting
creates a line-drawing problem: the difference between a trader and an investor is not
made clear in the Code or in the regulations; rather, a court-created balancing test is used
to weigh whether a person or entity is a trader or an investor, and even still, the answer
is not always clear. See, e.g., Purvis v. Comm'r, 530 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1976)
(stating that, to distinguish traders from investors, courts should examine "the frequency,
extent, and regularity of petitioner's securities transactions as well as his intent to derive
profit from relatively short-term turnovers").
113.
See I.R.C. § 475(f).
114.
Rev. Proc. 99-17, 1999-1 C.B. 503, 504-05.
115.
Id.
116.
See I.R.C. § 475(f)(1)(B).
117.
If a trader engages in hundreds or thousands of trades each year, it may be
difficult to keep track of the movement of each individual security's tax basis, when it was
bought, and when it was sold.
See Jim Forrester, Mark to Market Accounting,
http://www.traderslog.com/mark-to-market.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2007). Under markto-market, a trader only has to keep track of what the value of its portfolio was at the end
of the previous year, how much it has sold and bought in the ensuing year, and what the
value of its portfolio is at the end of the current year. Id.
118.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (2006). The exceptions are essentially state-law
corporations and certain foreign entities, which are treated as corporations in all
instances. See generally T.D. 8697, 1997-1 C.B. 215 (summarizing tax treatment of
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default, a non-corporate domestic entity is classified as a
partnership "if it has two or more members ...disregarded as an
entity separate from its owner if it has a single owner." 119 A
foreign entity that is not on the de facto corporation list is
classified as an "association if all of its members have limited
liability" and as a partnership "if it has two or more members
and at least one member does not have limited liability" for the
debts and liabilities of the entity. 120 However, regardless of the
entity's default classification, it can file an IRS Form 8832 in
which it elects whether it will be treated as an association
taxable as a corporation, a partnership, or a disregarded
entity. 121
However, "[p]rior to [the enactment ofl the check-the-box
regulations, the determination of whether an entity was treated
as a corporation subject to the double tax, or a partnership
subject to only a single tax, was based on four factors that
described platonic notions of partnership and corporations." 122 In
Morrissey v. Commissioner,12 3 the Supreme Court was asked to
determine whether a real estate trust could be taxed as an
association (which for tax purposes is treated as a corporation)
even though it was formally a trust. 124 The Supreme Court
stated that "classification cannot be said to require organization
under a statute" 125 and proceeded to ask what were "the salient
features of a trust . . . which may be regarded as making it
analogous to a corporate organization?"' 126 The Supreme Court
then enumerated the essential elements of a corporation, 12 7 and
applied the criteria to the case before it, holding that the real
estate trust had more corporate properties than 8trust properties
and was therefore to be taxed as an association. 12

domestic and foreign entities as related to their election of partnership or association
status).
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1) (2006).
119.
Id. § 301.7701-3(b)(2).
120.
Id. § 301.7701-3(a), (c)(1)(i). The Treasury's authority to promulgate such
121.
regulations has been challenged; the court held that it was within the Treasury's
authority to issue interpretive regulations under Code § 7805(a). See Littriello v. United
States, No. Civ.A.3:04CV-143-H, 2005 WL 1173277, at 3 (W.D. Ky. May 18, 2005).
122. David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing,Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1628 (1999).
123. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
See id. at 346-47.
124.
Id. at 357.
125.
Id. at 359.
126.
See id. at 359-60.
127.
128.
Id. at 360.
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Over the next 20 years, as more individuals began filing
income tax returns, professional groups began "to create
associations and file corporate tax returns." 129 The IRS opposed
such filings and, when it became apparent that it was going to
lose the war on corporate associations, it issued the "Kintner
Regulations." 130
Under the Kintner Regulations, the six
characteristics of a corporation were: "(1) associates, (2) an
objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom, (3)
continuity of life, (4) centralization of management, (5) liability
for corporate debts limited to corporate property, and (6) free
transferability of interests."1 3' Because characteristics (1) and
(2) are "common to both partnerships and corporations," the
court stated that "they are generally disregarded in
distinguishing between the two." 32 Entities that had enough of
these corporate factors were deemed to be corporations for tax
purposes 'because they were closer to the platonic notion of a
corporation than to the notion of a partnership."'' 33 Even prior to
the check-the-box regulations, "[t]axpayers could manipulate the
four factors," so that they could "choose their classification," but
' 34
the costs were "significant."'
B.

Proposed Elective Regime for FinancialInstruments

The similarity between the pre-check-the-box method of
determining entity classification and the current method of
determining the proper method of taxing financial instruments is
striking. In both cases, the classification must be made by
analogy. However, the entity/instrument to which taxpayers are
analogizing is itself slippery and without literal existence. This
creates both uncertainty and opportunity to try to game the
system by choosing the form that is most tax-advantageous, and
trying to design the entity/instrument in a way that fits as
closely to the desired tax result as possible while fulfilling the
desired business purpose.
Given the similarities between pre-1996 entity classification
and current taxation of financial instruments, this Article
proposes an elective tax regime, similar to the check-the-box
regime.

129.
130.
appeared
131.
132.
133.
134.

Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729, 733 (1975).
The Kintner Regulations were Treas. Regs. §§ 301.7701-1 through -11, and
in T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 412. Zuckman, 524 F.2d at 734.
Id. at 733 (citing Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1)).
Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2)).
Weisbach, supranote 122, at 1628.
See id. at 1629; see also supra Part III.B (discussing efficiency).
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Under this proposed regime, a taxpayer will choose between
two treatments for her financial instruments: mark-to-market or
"Stated Term" taxation. 135 Until she makes an election, an
investor will, by default, be taxed using the Stated Term method.
Although mark-to-market accounting is economically the most
accurate way to tax financial instruments because it presents
liquidity and valuation issues, mark-to-market taxation of
financial instruments is best implemented on an opt-in basis. By
making Stated Term the default, these difficulties in mark-tomarket taxation will only apply to investors who believe they
have access to the information and liquid assets mark-to-market
requires.
The election will be effective for all financial
instruments entered into in taxable years following the year in
which an investor makes the election. 136 Under this election,

135.
Note that these are not the only possible ways to treat financial instruments.
For example, requiring taxpayers to conform the book and tax treatment of financial
instruments would eliminate certain planning opportunities. See Keinan, supra note 1, at
681. However, book-tax conformity does not solve the current problems with the taxation
of financial instruments. Generally accepted accounting principles in the United States
("GAAP") generally require taxpayers to mark-to-market their positions in financial
instruments.
See id. at 683-84.
In addition, some taxpayers may not have the
information or liquidity to do so. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. The same
frictions between book and tax treatment, especially for individuals and closely-held
corporations that do not have to produce financial statements for the general public, do
not exist between debt and equity; a publicly-held corporate taxpayer would rather have
debt for tax purposes so that it can deduct interest paid, but equity for book purposes so
that its capitalization appears better. Keinan, supra note 1, at 701-02. Additionally, and
perhaps most importantly, by imposing book-tax conformity, the Treasury and the IRS
would be forced to cede control of the tax treatment of financial instruments to the
financial accountings standards board ("FASB"), and would be required to decide whether
to interpret FASB rules itself or to follow FASB's interpretation. Id. at 690. Also,
financial instruments could be taxed in any of the ways they are currently taxed. For
example, among other possible methods, the tax law could impose a zero tax rate. See
generally Schizer, supra note 1, at 1924-25 (discussing issues relating the zero rate
approach). Another method could be to tax the expected value of a transaction. See
Shuldiner, supra note 1, at 283-284. Lastly, tax law could even impute interest based on
a reference and tax date and, after realization, make any necessary adjustments. See
Bradford, supra note 1, at 770. However, for reasons to be discussed infra Part IV.B,
mark-to-market and stated term seem to be the simplest, most easily administered
methods that prevent taxpayers from exploiting inefficiencies.
136.
The check-the-box election can be made effective up to 75 days prior to or 12
months subsequent to a taxpayer's filing IRS Form 8832. Treas. Reg. § 301.77013(c)(1)(iii) (2006). If an investor in financial instruments had that option, however, it
would allow her one opportunity to wait 75 days to determine how her portfolio was doing
and which election was most advantageous. It seems unlikely that an investor, or at least
an investor who expected to invest in financial instruments again in the future, would
elect tax treatment based on a one-time advantageous treatment of her portfolio, but that
is a possibility. The mark-to-market election, by contrast, permits an entity to make the
election in its first year of existence by making a notation in its books and filing a
statement with its first income tax return; otherwise, an entity or individual taxpayer
may elect to mark-to-market in the subsequent year. Rev. Proc. 99-17, 1999-1 C.B. 503,
504-5. For purposes of elective taxation of financial instruments, it makes sense for the
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losses from financial instruments will be fully deductible for all
taxpayers. 137
1.

Stated Term

Under the proposed elective regime, upon entering into a
financial instrument, an investor will be indifferent to the timing
rules and the rate of tax, provided they are known in advance
and are the same for gains and losses. The indifference can only
exist, however, if timing and rates are clearly understood. The
timing rule of the Stated Term approach 138 requires taxpayers
"to precommit to a date on which they will recognize their gains
and losses."' 139 Presumably, such date would be the settlement
date of the contract. On that date, and not before or after, the
taxpayer will include her gain into income or will deduct her loss.
Even if she settles the contract early, or sells it (at a gain or loss)
to a third party, she will not recognize her gain or loss on the
40
financial instrument until the settlement date. 1
Under the Stated Term approach, gain and loss will be
capital in character. Under the current tax system, long-term

election to take effect in the taxable year following the year in which an investor files her
election.
There would also be a transition period; the elective regime should become
effective for financial instruments entered into in the taxable year following the effective
date of the enacting legislation. That would allow investors a transition year in which
they could make the election, allowing their election to be effective at the earliest possible
taxable year. Any instrument entered into before the new regime that became effective
would continue to be taxed under the rules that applied to it before.
137.
See infra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
138.
This Article comes to the term and concept "Stated Term" via Professor Schizer,
who mentions that it is similar to Bradford's suggestion. See Schizer, supra note 1, at
1920 (citing Bradford, supra note 1, at 770-71). However, Professor Schizer's version,
without imputed interest and redetermination of basis after the fact, is easier to
understand and easier to comply with. In addition, financial instruments are zero sum,
and the purpose in taxing them is to discourage people from trying to recast wage and
time-value returns as risk-based returns. Id. at 1924-25. Therefore, rather than raising
revenue, it does not matter that the taxpayer manages to delay the potential payment of
tax because she is also forced to delay the possible use of a deduction; in this situation she
does not know when she enters into the transaction if she will have a gain or a loss. See
supra Part II.C.
139.
See Schizer, supra note 1, at 1920.
140.
Example: Taxpayer enters into the long side a cash-settled forward contract for
widgets on January 1, 2008, with a termination date of January 1, 2011. The contract is
for 50 widgets at $100 per widget. Under a realization system, if, on December 28, 2010,
the value of widgets has dropped to $95, she would terminate the contract in order to take
a $250 loss ($5 loss on each of 50 widgets) on her 2010 tax return. If,however, widgets
are worth $105, she will wait until the termination date, and take the $250 into income on
her 2011 tax return. The stated term approach eliminates her timing option. Even if she
were to settle the contract for a loss on December 28, 2009, she would not realize the loss
for tax purposes until January 1, 2011.
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capital gain 14 ' is generally taxed at a rate of 15%.142 Short-term
capital gain' 43 is taxed at ordinary income rates.' 44 The Stated
Term approach would use the standard long-term and short-term
rules, except that, rather than being based on how long an
investor holds the instrument, the determination of whether an
instrument is long-term or short-term would be based on the
length of time between an investor's entering into the instrument
and the settlement date.
Although generally the simpler of the two possible elections,
a taxpayer electing to treat her financial instruments under the
Stated Term regime would, in some cases, be required to
separate her return into a risk-based component and a non-riskbased' 45 component. 46 Commentators have generally recognized
this problem, and have suggested a number of solutions on how
to separately account for risk-based and nonrisk-based income. '47
141.
A long-term capital gain is a capital gain on assets held for more than one year.
See I.R.C. § 1222(3) (2000).
142.
Id. § 1(h)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 2004).
143.
A short-term capital gain is a capital gain on assets held for one year or less.
See id. § 1222(1) (2000).
144.
Id. § 1(h); Michelle Arnopol Cecil, Toward Adding Further Complexity to the
Internal Revenue Code: A New Paradigmfor the Deductibility of Capital Loss, 99 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1083, 1120, 1129 (1999) (giving examples of tax treatment for capital gains and
losses). It is important, too, that, both under this and the mark-to-market approach,
income and losses on financial instruments not be included in a taxpayer's adjusted gross
income. If gains and losses were includible in adjusted gross income, "gains [could] shift
taxpayers into a higher bracket (increasing the government's share), while losses [could]
shift taxpayers into a lower bracket (reducing the government's share)." Schizer, supra
note 1, at 1908 (citing Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Deductability by Individuals of Capital
Losses Under the Federal Income Tax, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 291, 305 (1973)). This potential
shifting would mean that a taxpayer's upside and downside were not exactly equivalent.
145.
Typically, a non-risk-based return on a financial instrument would be a timevalue-of-money return (e.g., interest income), although it is conceivable that an investor
would attempt to disguise her wage income as a return on a financial instrument. For
these purposes, however, the difference is of minimal, if any, importance. See Schizer,
supra note 1, at 1921.
146.
A non-risk-based return cannot be scaled up without cost. Thus, the idea that,
ex ante, a taxpayer is indifferent to how the return is taxed does not hold where it is nonrisk-based. This is because both wage and time value income have positive expected
values. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. Therefore, there is some incentive for
an investor, who has elected Stated Term treatment, to try to re-characterize her non-risk
as risk-based.
In doing so, she will be delaying the inclusion of income with no
corresponding risk that she could instead be delaying a loss. Furthermore, the income
will be eligible to be taxed at the more-favorable long-term capital gain rate. Note,
however, that an investor who had elected mark-to-market treatment would not have any
incentive to re-characterize income because all of her income, both risk- and non-riskbased, would be recognized annually and taxed at ordinary rates. See infra text
accompanying notes 162-67.
147.
See, e.g., Warren, supra note 1, at 473-82 (discussing possible tax policy
responses, including mark-to-market, integration of positions, limitations on expenses,
disaggregation, and formulaic taxation of contingent returns); Shuldiner, supra note 1, at
283-90 (advocating the use of the "expected value transaction" approach).
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Bifurcating the return into risk-based and non-risked based
income is sensible given the tendency of the ordinary investor to
select the Stated Term regime. Using the current original issue
discount rules, 148 a taxpayer would take into income annually
over the life of the instrument a portion of the guaranteed return,
while delaying inclusion of any risk-based component. 149
To ensure the international competitiveness of U.S. financial
markets, gains and losses on financial instruments will be
sourced to the jurisdiction of the payee. 150 Conceptually, this
generally follows the current treatment of swaps. 15 1 There are
certain ambiguities in the sourcing rules for swaps, however, this
Article proposes to resolve these for purposes of Stated Term
taxation.
Under the swap sourcing rules, it is potentially unclear,
where an investor is a multinational entity, which jurisdiction is
most relevant for tax purposes. 15 2 The confusion can arise
thusly: German Bank has its U.S. Subsidiary enter into a
financial product. U.S. Subsidiary also operates in Bermuda and
uses a Bermudian bank account to receive and make payments
on the interest. The question becomes, is the payee (and thus the
source) the German Bank, the U.S. Subsidiary, or the Bermuda
bank? 153 For purposes of the Stated Term approach, if the
investor is an individual, financial instrument income or loss
would be sourced to the United States if the investor is a citizen
or resident of the United States. If the investor is a corporation,
financial instrument income will be sourced to the United States

148.
See I.R.C. § 1273.
149.
It could be argued that a portion of the return, even on an instrument that
appears entirely risk-based, is actually the result of inflation. See Weisbach, supra note
19, at 30. Although that is true, the current tax law (sensibly) ignores that portion of a
return-the sheer complexity of determining what portion of the return on a financial
instrument was attributable to inflation would be staggering. In addition, because
financial instruments generally do not continue for more than three years, the effects of
inflation should be negligible (as opposed, for example, to the holding of a share of IBM
for 40 years-some portion of that return is not really gain, and probably should not be
taxed). See id. at 31. However, this is beyond the scope of this article.
150.
See, e.g., Avi-Yonah & Swartz, supra note 1 ("For portfolio investors in countries
without U.S. tax treaties, avoiding the 30 percent withholding tax on dividends is a
powerful incentive to forego the voting rights associated with a direct investment in stock
[by entering into a swap replicating dividend payments on the swap].").
151.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.863-7(b)(1) (2006); see also I.R.C. § 988(a)(3)(B)(i).
152.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.863-6 (2006).
153.
Note that, for U.S tax purposes, this would not be an issue if the subsidiary
were, for example, Swiss. Our sourcing rules are binary-the source is either domestic or
foreign. Nonetheless, a rule which assigns the source to a jurisdiction allows the binary
judgment to be made.

HeinOnline -- 8 Hous. Bus. & Tax L.J. 26 2007-2008

2007]

TAXING RISK-BASED FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS

27

if the corporation is engaged in trade or business in the United
5 4
States.
If the investor is a non-U.S. partnership or other passthrough entity (or a hybrid entity), the Stated Term approach can
adopt an approach used in several tax treaties. Under this
approach, for any U.S. member of the pass-through entity, if the
member is treated as the owner of the entity's income for U.S.
purposes, the income will be domestic source income. But if the
income is treated as belonging to the entity, it will be foreign55
source income for U.S. tax purposes.
2.

Mark-to-Market

As alluded to supra, mark-to-market taxation requires an
investor to annually determine the value of her investments-she
would pay tax on any increase in value from the prior year, or if
her investments lose value, she would take a deduction. 156 Markto-market accounting is broadly recognized as the most accurate
system of accounting for income. 15 7 In spite of its theoretical
superiority, however, mark-to-market accounting is not widely
used, for two significant reasons.
First, it is difficult to
accurately value positions in derivatives. 15 Second, even where
154.
See I.R.C. § 864(c)(2) (stating the rule for US-sourced income for corporations);
see also id. § 864(c)(1) (defining effectively-connected income for individuals). If the
corporation's only contact with the U.S. is trading stocks and securities and it has no fixed
place of business in the U.S., and it will not be deemed to be engaged in trade or business
in the United States. Id. § 864(b)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.864-2(c) (2006).
155.
See, e.g., Convention Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Japan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on, U.S.-Japan, Nov. 6, 2003, art. 4, § 6, cl. b. As
an example, a Bermuda exempted limited company enters into a financial instrument
with German Bank on January 1, 2008, with a settlement date of January 1, 2010. The
Bermuda company has two investors with equal shares, a U.S. individual and a Canadian
individual. For U.S. tax purposes, the Bermuda company has elected to be treated as a
partnership. See supra text accompanying note 91. If, at the settlement date of the
contract, the German bank pays $100 to the Bermuda company, the $50 attributable to
the U.S. individual's share will be sourced as U.S. income, and the U.S. individual will
owe $7.50 (a long-term capital gain rate of 15%) in taxes. The other $50, however, will be
considered non-U.S. source. If the Bermuda company is treated as a pass-through entity
for Canadian purposes, the U.S. would source that income to Canada, and if it is treated
as a corporation, it would be sourced to Bermuda. Either way, it is not taxed in the
United States.
156.
I.R.C. § 475.
157.
Keinan, supra note 1, at 683-84 (quoting Bank One Corp. v. Comm'r, 120 T.C.
174, 228-30 (2003) ('Mark-to-market accounting has for decades been considered by
academia and other commentators to be the most theoretically desirable of all the various
systems of taxing income in that mark-to-market accounting consistently measures and
levies tax on a taxpayer's economic (or Haig-Simons) income.")).
158.
Miller, supra note 110, at 1073. Mr. Miller points out, however, that publiclytraded securities are already required to be marked-to-market under GAAP, and that
dealers are required to, and traders are permitted to, mark their positions to market
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an investor can accurately value her position in a financial
instrument at the end of the year, she may or may not have
liquid assets available to pay taxes on her appreciation. 159
These two problems are functionally irrelevant, however,
when an investor chooses to be taxed on a mark-to-market basis:
"The perceptional and political issues surrounding the imposition
of a mark-to-market regime are not presented if it is
voluntary.... Voluntary mark-to-market treatment achieves
economic taxation, neutrality, and financial instrument
1 60
consistency, but only for the taxpayers so electing."
Presumably, only taxpayers who believe that they could both
accurately and cheaply value their positions in financial
instruments, and believed that they would have the liquid assets
to pay taxes on those positions, would elect to mark their
positions in financial instruments to market. 161
A taxpayer who has elected mark-to-market treatment of her
financial instrument income will include the returns annually as
ordinary income or loss. Treating the income as ordinary
eliminates the incentive to reclassify wage and time-value
returns as financial instrument income.1 62 Investors should be
under I.R.C. § 475. Id. An election that allows even investors to mark-to-market their
positions in financial instruments presumably will carry with it the market incentive to
make such valuations available to all investors. However, as is discussed infra, it is not
necessary to the election regime that mark-to-market data be voluntarily made available
to all investors (for free or at a fee).
159.
See id. at 1053. Imagine a worst-case scenario: our investor has elected to be
taxed on a mark-to-market basis; she purchases a futures contract on oil in January 2008,
with a settlement date of January 1, 2011. Nine months after entering into the contract,
Venezuela and the Middle East agree to stop selling oil to the United States. Overnight,
the value of her futures contract quadruples, and at the end of the year, our investor
experiences huge paper gains. However, as of December 31, 2008, her tax liability is 35%
of the huge paper gains. At this point, she has limited choices: she can sell her futures
contract, realize the gain, and pay her taxes, but if the Middle East situation does not
appear to be clearing up, she loses the next two years' potential appreciation. She can sell
other investments or property, but, unless she intended to sell, her tax liability forces her
to do something that she did not intend to do. She can borrow against her equity in the
investment. Or she can evade taxes, breaking the law and face huge penalties and,
potentially, jail time.
160.
Miller, supra note 1, at 257-58.
161.
This is the principal reason that Stated Term would serve as the default for
taxpayers. Professor Schizer sees similar approaches with Stated Term and mark-tomarket. See Schizer, supra note 1, at 1920 & n.117. However, for purposes of the
proposed elective regime, the two are different enough to appeal to a full spectrum of
taxpayers.
While mark-to-market reflects generally accepted corporate financial
accounting standards and the economic value of a transaction, Stated Term gives an
investor certainty and liquidity. See id. at 1920 & n.l17, 1942-43; Miller, supra note 110
at 1055.
162.
See Herbert Stein, Op-Ed., Common Sense on Capital Gains, WALL ST. J., Aug.
23, 1989 (explaining that the difference in the capital gains and income tax rates causes
"some people [to pay] less tax than other people with the same income" due to the fact
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indifferent to the rate, since they can scale up their investment
in order to achieve the desired real-dollar return with little or no
cost. 163 Because an investor can determine her desired after-tax
return, and at little or no extra upfront cash outlay, enter into a
financial instrument in that amount,1 64 she should not mind that
her tax rate is higher.
Furthermore, in a loss position, taxation at ordinary rates is
advantageous to investors. Generally, capital losses can only be
deducted against capital gains. 165 A mark-to-market taxpayer,
however, will net all of her gain and loss positions in financial
instruments; in a loss position she may have no capital gain to
offset. 1 66 Most investors will have ordinary income from wages
every year. An investor in financial instruments is partnering de
facto with the government in her gains and losses, 167 but the
partnership is not perfect. While the government takes its own
portion of gains, it does not refund the taxpayer its portion of
losses. 168 When an investor in financial instruments deducts her
losses, even against wage income, she is not sheltering her wage
income. 169 Instead, the government is absorbing its portion of
the taxpayer's loss.
C.

Policy Concerns in an Elective Regime

Permitting elective tax treatment of financial instruments
means that the tax treatment of the same financial instrument
may be different for similarly situated taxpayers. Consistency
will solely be at the level of each discrete taxpayer.170 The fact
that the two parties may treat the same instrument differently is
not a significant change from the current treatment of financial
instruments, and should not be troubling from a policy

that "capital gains already are taxed less than most other forms of income."). If the
Government began treating financial instrument income as ordinary income, taxpayers
would realize no tax savings at all by reclassifying one type of income to another.
163.
See Schizer, supra note 1, at 1898-99; see also id. at 1891 n.11 (on the betscaling idea "elaborated in an extensive literature").
164.
See id.
165.
I.R.C. § 1211(b) (2000) (an individual can deduct up to $3000 of capital losses
annually against ordinary income).
166.
It is possible that she will have realized capital gain from, for example, the sale
of securities or the sale of a home, but she is unlikely to have significant amounts of such
capital gain on an annual basis.
167.
See Dodge, supra note 74, at 444-45.
168.
See id. at 445.
169.
See id.
170.
It is important to keep in mind that "inconsistencies in the taxation of risky bets
do not prompt planning as long as taxpayers precommit to their treatment." Schizer,
supra note 1, at 1911.

HeinOnline -- 8 Hous. Bus. & Tax L.J. 29 2007-2008

30 HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VIII
perspective.
Under current tax law, if a taxpayer is an
investor 171 and enters into a financial instrument with a
counterparty that is foreign, tax-exempt, 172 a dealer, 173 or an
electing trader,1 74 the tax treatment of the investor and the
counterparty is likely already different. Furthermore, Congress
and the Treasury have presumably recognized the difference in
treatment and, for policy or other reasons, intended that the
treatment be different. 175
Furthermore, such elective treatment is consistent with
horizontal equity. Although similarly situated taxpayers will be
treated differently on the same investment, each investor has the
possibility of being treated identically. If there is a difference in
the tax treatment of investors, such difference is of their own
choosing.
V.

TAX REFORM

The difficulty in fundamental reform of the taxation of
financial instruments is the same as the fundamental reform of
any portion of the tax system: fundamental reform is generally
politically unpalatable unless and until the general public
becomes fed up with the current system.1 76 Because of its
complicated and obscure nature, the general public is unlikely to
mobilize against the current problems with the taxation of
financial instruments. 177 Commentators are pessimistic about
171.
See I.R.C. § 475(f); Purvis v. Comm'r, 530 F.2d 1332, 1333-34 (9th Cir. 1976); see
also supra note 84 (a party is already required to know if it is an investor, trader, or
dealer, and the judicial test is not completely clear).
172.
Tax-exempt taxpayers are taxed on their "unrelated business taxable income,"
which is generally active business income and income financed by debt. I.R.C. § 512(a)(1),
(b)(4); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-l(a)(1) (as amended in 1992).
173.
See I.R.C. § 475(a) (providing rules which "apply to securities held by a dealer in
securities").
174.
See id. § 475(f).
175.
For example, there is value in exempting certain organizations from tax; in
order for the U.S. to be a market for financial transactions, which technically do not
depend on a location, it is important not to tax foreign counterparties.
176.
Even an unpopular tax, such as the alternative minimum tax, can be difficult to
eliminate. National Taxpayer Advocate Nina E. Olson discussed her abortive attempt to
have the alternative minimum tax repealed. In 2006, she said she felt like Congress
would "wait until the very last minute, when we do have the crisis, and that will be the
driver. You know, basically, people standing up like in the movie 'Network' saying, 'I'm
mad as heck and I won't take it anymore!"' Nina Olson on Taxpayer Advocacy at the
Internal Revenue Service, Tax Foundation's 'Tax Policy Podcast," Sept. 19, 2006, 2006
TNT 182-25, availableat http://www.taxfoundation.org/podcast/show/1837.html.
177.
If the perceived abuse involving financial instruments is sufficiently egregious,
however, the public may clamor for change. In the 1990s, several high-wealth, highprofile individuals used shorts-against-the-box to cash out of appreciated stock positions
while deferring (possibly forever) tax on their gains. See Knoll, supra note 1, at 88 n.90

HeinOnline -- 8 Hous. Bus. & Tax L.J. 30 2007-2008

2007] TAXING RISK-BASED FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS

31

the likelihood of achieving major reform and prefer to offer small
achievable reforms. 78 The advantage of the elective regime
suggested by this Article is that it is an incremental rather than
major reform. It could be implemented by Congress' passage of a
single new section of the Code. Congress would not be required
to determine the underlying economics of each existing financial
instrument and foretell what potential instruments have yet to
arise.
Yet, in spite of its incremental nature, it could
fundamentally consolidate and simplify the taxation of financial
instruments. 179
Still, even though the proposed reform is simple, is it
necessary? This Article has put a premium on simplicity and
administrability.
It would seem simplest and most easily
administrable to not impose any tax on financial instruments.
Although counterintuitive, because an investor can scale up her
investments in financial instruments to achieve the after-tax
return she wants,18 0 a zero rate on financial instruments creates
precisely the same tax consequences for the investor and the
government as any other rate.'18 In order to earn an expected
after-tax return on $100 at a zero rate, a taxpayer would have to
invest $100.182 Also, where the government is an economically
rational actor, the government is in the same position regardless
of whether there is a 50% rate or a zero rate on financial
(citing Diana B. Henriques with Floyd Norris, Wealthy, Helped by Wall St., Find New
Ways to Escape Tax on Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996, § 1, at 1) (giving examples of this
strategy). Although the tax advantages of shorts-against-the-box had been around for
over 75 years, press reports of the wealthy individuals avoiding taxes finally compelled
Congress to act. William M. Paul, Constructive Sales under New Section 1259, 77 TAX
NOTES 1467 (Sept. 15, 1997) (discussing the notable example of the use of this strategy by
the Estee Lauder family). Also, as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1997, Congress added
§ 1259 to the tax code, creating the constructive sale rules. Knoll, supra note 1, at 88.
178.
See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 1, at 1891 ("[T]he objective here is to provide
policymakers with an agenda for incremental reform .... "); Strnad, supra note 1, at 60405 ("Repairing the'major discontinuities and inconsistencies in current law would require
fundamental reform ....
Even if Congress implements major changes, it is likely that
some significant inconsistencies and discontinuities will remain. This fact, and the
darker possibility that no major reform will occur, create difficult choices for the Treasury
Department and the courts ....
Perhaps the only viable alternative for dealing with new
financial instruments is the traditional one of analyzing the normative stakes for each
type of transaction and then crafting a detailed response.").
179.
Furthermore, if Congress or the Treasury found that a new financial instrument
was somehow abusive in spite of the elective regime, Congress would have the option of
carving out a new rule for that derivative. However, carving out new instruments as they
arise goes counter to the spirit of simplification of the elective regime. It would be better
for the Treasury to designate such abusive instrument as a listed transaction under
Treasury Regulation 1.6011. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (as amended in 2007).
180.
See supratext accompanying notes 78-79.
181.
See Schizer, supranote 1, at 1924.
182.
See supra note 78. The formula can be represented thusly: 1/(1-0) x 100 = 100.
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instruments. If a taxpayer is long 8 3 on a financial instrument,
the government can hedge its potential risk by going short in the
same instrument. Returning to our investor who wants a return
of $100, if she knows that she will be taxed at 50%, she will
double the bet she would otherwise make. 184 If she wins, she will
receive $200, pay $100 in tax, and keep $100. If she loses, she
will pay $200, but will get a tax deduction against other income
of $100. This means that while the government can expect to
receive $100 if the investor wins, it can expect to lose $100 (by
means of not collecting tax it would otherwise collect) if she loses.
In order to hedge its position, the government should take a short
position with an expected value of $100 in the same instrument.
The government's short position, however, means that if the
investor wins, it will receive $100 from her, but pay $100 to its
counterparty. If the investor loses, the government loses $100 of
tax revenue from her, but receives $100 from its counterparty.
On a net basis, the government does not earn or lose any money
at a 50% rate. 8 5 The government's economic situation would
therefore be exactly the same if it had imposed no tax on
financial instruments.
While in theory a zero rate on financial instruments may be
desirable, for practical purposes it is both undesirable and
infeasible. A zero rate is undesirable because it would present
significant motivation for taxpayers to try to repackage non-riskbased returns as financial instruments: "[w]alling off these
instruments will introduce complexity, and the zero rate will give
taxpayers added incentive to game this distinction." 18 6 While a
zero rate would reduce complexity, it would create distortions for
individuals with high wage income, currently taxable at a federal
rate of 35%. Such individuals would find it worth significant cost
in attorney's and accountant's fees to transform wage income into
financial
instrument
income,
thereby
increasing
the
government's policing cost. 187

183.
"Long" means that the taxpayer wins "if the market price goes up, and loses in
the event of a decline in the market." Valley Waste Mills v. Page, 115 F.2d 466, 467 (5th
Cir. 1940).
184.
See supratext accompanying note 78.
185.
See Weisbach, supranote 19, at 17-19.
186.
Schizer, supra note 1, at 1924. Professor Schizer goes on to state, "We need a
positive tax rate on risky bets not to collect revenue on these bets themselves, but to
collect revenue from other things that otherwise would be repackaged to look like risky
bets. Given the importance of this problem, the zero rate should be used sparingly." Id.
at 1925.
187.
Id. If a taxpayer made $500,000 a year in wages, taxable at a flat rate of 35%, it
may be worth spending $150,000 to transform her wages into financial instrument
income; she would still be $25,000 better off than if she had paid her taxes. However, the
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Second, in spite of compelling arguments that risk-based
returns should not be taxed if we truly want the federal income
tax to adopt a Haig-Simons definition of income,18 8 eliminating
the tax on financial instruments would be a political and policy
non-starter. There is no advantage to either side of the aisle of
eliminating the tax, which would doubtless be viewed as a tax cut
for the wealthy, whether or not the change actually amounted to
a cut in anybody's effective tax rate. Furthermore, from a policy
perspective, whether a tax regime "appears to be fair to the
layperson can be as important a question as whether, under
sophisticated economic or legal analysis, the proposed system is
18 9
fair."
For those lawmakers who favor tax cuts, there is no reason
to waste their limited political capital on eliminating the taxation
of financial instruments. As has been amply demonstrated, if the
taxation of gains equals the taxation of losses and an investor
can scale up her investments, she is indifferent to the tax rate. 190
Tax cuts would be better aimed toward taxes on wage and timevalue income, to which no one is indifferent. In spite of the fact
that the zero rate is the economic equivalent to a 50% rate, and
because investors in financial instruments are generally
corporations and wealthy individuals, an opponent of the
politician voting for such a change could easily suggest that the
politician was voting for tax cuts for the wealthy. 191 On the other
hand, for a politician opposed to tax cuts for the wealthy, there
would be no advantage to cutting the tax rate on financial
instruments.
Because of the difficulties in creating and policing a zero
rate, it makes sense to reform the taxation of financial

$150,000 is essentially waste, as it was paid to avoid paying taxes, and neither the
taxpayer nor the government has that money.
188.
See Weisbach, supra note 19, at 1 n.1 ("[An ideal Haig-Simons tax taxes
individuals on the change in value of their assets in each period. If an individual's assets
go up in value, she owes tax, producing a tax on capital income.").
189.
John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type Income Tax
Proposals in the United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental Tax Reform, 88
CAL. L. REV. 2095, 2147 (2000).
190.
See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
191.
Although there is a vocal consistency advocating the elimination of the estate
tax, no one has yet been successful at having the estate tax repealed. See Kathleen
Pender, No Tax Law Changes Expected While Bush Is Still in Office, S.F. CHRON., Nov.
12, 2006, at Fl. Although the estate tax is a tax on the most wealthy (in the case of
decedents who die in 2008, it is only imposed on estates exceeding $2 million in value
(I.R.C. § 2010(c) (Supp. IV 2004))), even some Americans whose net worth is substantially
below that amount support its repeal, possibly under the belief that if they work hard
enough, it could affect them. Id. It is hard to envision such an egalitarian outcry for a
zero rate on financial instrument income.
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instruments in a manner that maintains some level of tax on
income from such instruments. Furthermore, reform through the
creation of an elective regime for financial instruments does not
present other politically unpalatable problems that much of the
other tax reform regimes present. Theoretically, effecting this
elective regime should not have any cost in terms of lost revenue
to the government.192 Because every gain an investor earns is
matched by a counterparty's loss, the net result of a balanced
treatment of gains and losses results in no net gain or loss for the
93
government on the taxation of financial instruments.1
Although the counterparties to a single instrument may be
treated differently on that instrument (i.e., the winner marks-tomarket annually at ordinary rates, while the loser recognizes a
long-term capital loss on the expiration date of the instrument),
gains and losses should be distributed in similar proportions
between mark-to-market and Stated Term taxpayers. Although
the adoption of this elective regime will likely result in some
amount of revenue gain or loss for the government, that amount
should not be material. So even under rules requiring that any
tax cut be offset by an equivalent spending cut, Congress would
not be forced to eliminate spending to fund the reform.
Likewise, the reform will not result in a tax increase for any
taxpayer. 94 It does not increase marginal rates or capital gain

192.
Practically, there may be certain costs. For example, individual investors' losses
on financial instruments will be fully deductible rather than being subject to the current
2% floor. See supra note 73. However, if investors in financial instruments would
generally get past the 2% floor even without deducting their financial instruments (e.g.,
by deducting mortgage interest and charitable contributions), the deduction of losses on
financial instruments should not cost the government anything because those losses
would, by virtue of being stacked on top of other deductions, be fully deductible anyway.
Furthermore, this elective regime neutralizes the timing option whereby taxpayers
accelerate losses while not realizing gain positions.
Finally, certain investors are
presumably taking advantage of uncertainties and inefficiencies in the current taxation of
financial instruments. With those uncertainties and inefficiencies eliminated, taxpayers
will pay taxes on instruments which they currently treat incorrectly.
193.
This is not technically entirely true. As is currently the case, certain
counterparties will continue to be tax-exempt and also foreign persons. Nonetheless, if
there is a sufficiently large distribution of these non-taxpaying counterparties, their gains
and losses should net to roughly zero, meaning the government continues to have no net
revenue or loss on the taxation of financial instruments. See Schizer, supra note 1, at
1894.
194.
For Republicans at least, the specter of tax increases (or at least nontransparent tax increases) is political suicide. The majority of Republicans in Congress,
as well as President George W. Bush, have signed the 'Taxpayer Protection Pledge,"
essentially a pledge to oppose all increases in taxes. See William G. Gale & Brennan
Kelly, The "No New Taxes" Pledge, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION AND TAX POLICY CENTER, at 4
(June 4, 2004), http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/gale/20040604.pdf. The Taxpayer
Protection Pledge is "enforced" by Americans for Tax Reform, "an organization that has
shown no remorse in attacking supporters of tax increases" Id. at 6. In addition, popular
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rates on the rich, the poor, or the middle-class.
Certain
individuals and corporations will pay more in tax than they
would under the various current rules, while others will pay less,
but no group will collectively feel the pinch of additional taxes.
Furthermore, if forced to sell the change to his or her
constituents, a politician could explain that reform also has nontax economic benefits: by simplifying and eliminating
inefficiencies, investors will not spend the money and time
currently required to understand and comply with, or plan
around, the cubbyholes of current derivative taxation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article builds on the recent explosion of literature
discussing the appropriate taxation of financial instruments, an
explosion that is, itself, a result both of the explosion of new
financial instruments and the current inability of the Code to
deal effectively and efficiently with financial instruments. The
current cubbyhole approach leads to a lag in the enactment of
new rules, as well as borders between instruments that are
sufficiently porous to allow significant arbitrage opportunities for
taxpayers with the resources to exploit these opportunities. In
addition, as financial instruments become more available to lesssophisticated investors, some greater measure of clarity will be
both useful and necessary.
An elective regime ignores many of the subtle economic
distinctions between different financial instruments.
The
purpose of this Article, however, has been to demonstrate that
such subtle distinctions are unimportant in taxing financial
instruments. Because of their zero-sum nature, and investors'
ability to enter into instruments based on their after-tax value,
the taxation of financial instruments is not a revenue-raiser for
the government, nor a drain on the revenue of investors.
Instead, the taxation of financial instruments serves to
discourage taxpayers from trying to recharacterize non-riskbased income as financial instrument income.
Although this Article has shown that such reform is
practical and painless for taxpayers and politicians, it has not
considered practical means of bringing such reform to the
forefront of the public's or Congress's attention. Commentators
have been discussing the problems with the taxation of financial
instruments for at least the last decade and a half, and no

belief holds that George H.W. Bush lost his reelection bid because he violated his promise
of "no new taxes." Id.
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fundamental reform has been forthcoming. This Article has
attempted to present a reform that would work, but without
somebody clamoring for reform it is unlikely to happen. With a
framework for reform, the next challenge will be to cause the
general public (most of whom are unaffected, at least directly by
financial instruments) to care.
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